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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper aims to assess the outcome of EU deregulation and competition 
policies on the competitive conditions of the main EU banking markets. 
Design/methodology/approach –After a review of deregulation and competitition 
policies in the EU banking industry, we test the degree of competition in the largest five 
EU banking markets using both structural (concentration ratios and Herfindahl-Hirshman 
Indices) and non-structural (H-statistics and Lerner Index) approaches.  
Findings – Results indicate that EU banking markets are becoming progressively more 
concentrated and that there is no evidence of an increase in competitive pressure. Country 
differences are also apparent thereby indicating that despite the sustained regulatory 
interventions, significant barriers to the integration of EU retail banking markets remain. 
In line with recent literature our analysis also seems to provide further evidence that 
concentration is not necessarily a good proxy for competition. 
Originality/value - Increased market concentration and its effects on competition are of 
relevance in a period of renewed EU regulatory efforts to remove the remaining barriers 
to the integration of financial markets. The evaluation of competitive conditions and 
market power in EU banking are therefore of interest to policy-makers and regulators.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Competition is generally considered a positive force in most industries; it is supposed to 
have a positive impact on an industry’s efficiency, quality of provision, innovation and 
international competitiveness. However, this issue has always been controversial in 
banking, as the perceived benefits derived from increased competition have to be 
weighted against the risks of potential instability. As a consequence, the banking industry 
has been historically heavily regulated. Furthermore, the existence of frictions in banking 
markets (for example, entry barriers and asymmetric information), cause the welfare 
theorems associated with perfect competition not to be directly applicable and allow 
room for the exercise of market power (Vives, 2001). Nevertheless, a healthy degree of 
rivalry is considered necessary for the dynamic efficiency of an industry and this 
principle is at the basis of the trend towards fostering greater competition in banking 
markets all over the world.  
In the European Union (EU) in particular, the past twenty years saw substantial 
deregulation of financial services, together with the establishment of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) and the introduction of the euro. These changes were aimed at 
fostering integration, removing entry barriers and promoting both competition and 
efficiency in the EU banking industry. However, several studies (ECB, 2008) have 
highlighted that the progress of the Single Market in financial services has been slow, 
particularly in the retail sector, and this calls into question the competitive conditions of 
EU banking markets. The European Commission (EC) is in charge of competition policy 
at the EU level, particularly in the areas of antitrust, cartels, mergers and acquisitions and 
the granting of state aid to financial institutions. Despite several landmark decisions in 
recent years, the task of the EC’s direct involvement in fostering competition is now 
constrained by the need of finding solutions to the current financial crisis. The presence 
of a possible trade-off between competition and stability has always played an important 
role at a policy level and gained even more prominence in light of recent events.  
Questions remain as to whether a certain degree of market power would be beneficial in 
banking to provide incentives for banks to undertake less risky strategies. In this context, 
the evaluation of competitive conditions and market power becomes increasingly 
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important for policy-makers and regulators. Competition authorities often rely on the 
validity of the structure- conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm and proxy competition 
with measures of market concentration, such as the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI). 
On the other hand, recent academic studies have shown concentration to be a poor proxy 
for competition. In this paper, we review the different methods proposed in the academic 
literature to assess the competitive conditions of banking markets. We then present the 
results of an empirical analysis of the dynamics of competition in EU banking markets 
since the year 2000. Concentrating on the commercial banking sector of the five largest 
EU banking markets (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK), we test the degree of 
competition by using both structural (concentration ratios, HHI) and non-structural 
methods (the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic and the Lerner index). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the main regulatory 
changes that aimed at fostering integration and competition in the EU. Section 3 briefly 
illustrates the design of competition policy at the EU level. Section 4 discusses the 
measurement of competition in the banking industry whereas Section 5 presents the 
results of the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Deregulation policies and competition in the EU banking markets  
 
At the beginning of the 1990s it was a widespread belief that the banking sector in 
Europe would enter a period of increased competition: the advent of the EMU and the 
introduction of the Euro in 1999 were expected to reinforce the pressure for the reduction 
of existing excess capacity and lead to increased internationalisation and geographical 
diversification, as well as to increased conglomeration and mergers and acquisitions.  
Regulatory developments have been an important factor shaping the structure of 
European banking markets. From 1 January 1993 the European legislation (Maastricht 
Treaty) created the ‘largest and most open banking market in the world’, by eliminating 
or lessening existing barriers and by introducing the single EU market for financial 
services. A number of studies have tried to estimate the potential welfare gains resulting 
from the completion of the single market. The Cecchini/Price Waterhouse (1988) study 
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was the first to analyse comparative competitive conditions across EU banking and 
financial systems. Their main assumption was that the single market would induce a 
series of integration effects that would promote the efficiency and competitiveness of EU 
firms through two channels: increased market size and heightened levels of competition. 
Twenty years after the publication of the Cecchini/Price Waterhouse findings, a number 
of studies have attempted to assess the impact of the EU regulatory intervention on 
banking sectors. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the sustained legislative 
changes at the EU level, have contributed towards the integration of European banking 
and financial markets (Goddard et al., 2007). There is some evidence of integration in 
money, bond and equity markets (Baele et al., 2004) and in wholesale banking (Cabral et 
al., 2002). However, most empirical studies suggest that significant barriers to the 
integration of retail banking markets still exist (Berger et al., 2001 and 2003).  
One of the effects of the regulatory changes (see Table 1) was to spur a trend towards 
consolidation, resulting in the recent wave of mergers and acquisitions. From a policy 
point of view, it is difficult to know what impact these structural developments are likely 
to have on the competitive environment and how they may influence the efficiency and 
stability of banking markets. On the one hand, increased concentration is expected to 
intensify market power and therefore hinder competition. On the other hand, it might be 
argued that if bank mergers and acquisitions are driven by economies of scale, then 
increased concentration may foster efficiency improvements. This indicates the 
importance of the assessment of competition in the industry, as well as the policies 
relevant to its maintenance. The issue concerning increased market concentration and its 
effect on competition and, indirectly, stability of the EU banking sector is of relevance in 
a period of renewed regulatory efforts to remove the remaining barriers and of increased 
domestic and cross border M&As. 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
Despite the mixed outcomes of EU regulatory changes fostering competition is still high 
on the policy agenda. The European Commission, in its recent White Paper on Financial 
Services Policy (2005-2010) has stated that its principal objectives include: “To 
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consolidate dynamically towards an integrated, open, inclusive, competitive, and 
economically efficient EU financial market and to remove the remaining economically 
significant barriers so financial services can be provided and capital can circulate freely 
throughout the EU at the lowest possible cost…” (SEC(2005) 1574).  
Within the European Commission, the competition department works to enhance 
competition in EU banking, insurance and securities markets. As stated in the White 
Paper (2005-2010), the aim of the Commission’s competition policy is to “use 
competition pro-actively to indentify and help tackle barriers in the Single Market”. 
 
 
3. Competition policy in the EU banking sector 
 
In general terms, competition policy means “applying rules to make sure that companies 
compete with each other and, in order to sell their products, innovate and offer good 
prices to consumers” (Todd, 2007). The current unified competition policy at the EU 
level (with the Commission as chief enforcer) is based on the 2004 Commission reform 
on merger control (the ‘EC Merger Regulation’ [1]) that intended to provide a “level 
playing field” in a “one-stop shop” [2] for the examination of mergers with a “community 
dimension”. According to this legislation, operations which would significantly impede 
effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position, would be declared incompatible with the common market. For 
operations below specific thresholds of turnover and sales, it is usually the national 
competition authorities in the EU member states to review the case and enforce 
competition policy [3]. 
In recent years, the role of the competition department within the European Commission 
has evolved to become increasingly ‘pro-active’: the Commission has carried out specific 
inquiries in sectors that are still characterised by high barriers to competition. For 
example, in 2007 an inquiry on the retail banking sector [4] highlighted a number of 
concerns, particularly in the European payments cards industry and credit database. 
The application of competition policy typically relates to: a) mergers, b) cartels, c) abuse 
of dominant position (antitrust) and d) state aid.  Regulatory concerns over mergers and 
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cartels have always played an important role in the EU. In the light of recent market 
developments, state aid is becoming an increasingly topical issue. 
 
 
a. Domestic and Cross-Border Mergers 
By creating or strengthening a dominant player, the outcome of a merger may result in 
reduced competition, which may harm consumers through higher prices, reduced choice 
or decreased innovation. The objective of the competition department is to examine 
proposed mergers and to prevent harmful effects to consumers. Mergers are examined at 
the EU level if they go beyond the national borders of a member state or if the combined 
entity exceeds a specified threshold in terms of global and European sales. If these 
conditions are not met, then the national competition authorities in each member state are 
responsible to review the merger. 
Only a handful of domestic mergers have been blocked by the national authorities. One 
example is that of the merger between Lloyds TSB and Abbey National that was 
prohibited by the UK competition commission in 2001.  
Cross-border operations, on the other hand, are less likely to be perceived as having 
substantial anti-competitive consequences. However, evidence has shown that often 
member states abuse the EC Merger Regulation to protect their national interests. In 
1999, the Portuguese authorities blocked the proposed takeover by BSCH (Banco 
Santander Central Hispano) of Portuguese group Champalimaud. In 2005, the former 
Governor of the Bank of Italy, Mr Fazio, was alleged to have favoured BPI (Banca 
Popolare Italiana)’s bid to buy another Italian bank, Banca Antoniana Popolare Veneta 
(Antonveneta), over ABN AMRO’s offer. These cases of apparent “misuse of 
supervisory power”, as defined by the Commission, have resulted in the 
acknowledgement of a complementary objective for competition policy, in the form of 
limitation of the discretion and powers of national supervisors (see also Carletti et al. 
2007). The new directive that resulted (“the Qualifying Holdings Directive”) is due for 
implementation in March 2009. Although it represents a significant step towards ensuring 
greater transparency and legal certainty in the supervisory control, it still has some 
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pitfalls, particularly in the form of lack of transparency and excessive discretion of the 
supervisory authorities (Carletti and Vives, 2008). 
 
b. Cartels 
An important role in the application of competition policy is played by cartels. A cartel is 
defined as a group of similar, independent firms which collude to pursue price fixing, to 
limit production or to share markets or customers between them. Cartels are illegal under 
EU competition law. Action against cartels is a type of antitrust enforcement. Evidence of 
cartels is not easy to find. In 2001 eight Austrian banks were fined over € 120 million by 
the Commission (OJ L 56, 24.02.2004) for their participation in a wide-ranging price 
cartel known as “the Lombard Club”. The cartel started well before the accession of 
Austria into the EU so for many years was used to fix deposit, lending and other rates in 
the entire Austrian territory. More recently the Commission fined Visa, a company that 
operates a large electronic payment network, for refusing to admit Morgan Stanley as a 
member of the card and payment systems between 2000 and 2006. The Commission 
found that Visa’s unjustified and discriminatory behaviour restricted competition in the 
provision of credit card acceptance services to merchants in the UK. The decision was 
also taken in line with the objectives of constructing a Single Euro Payments Area 
(SEPA). 
 
c. Abuse of dominant position 
According to the EC merger law, abuse of dominant position refers to predatory pricing 
aimed at eliminating competition in the market. The only recent case was in 2004, when 
the Commission found Clearstream Banking AG and its parent Clearstream International 
SA responsible for infringing competition rules. For about two years these banks refused 
to supply cross-border clearing and settlement services for registered shares issued under 
German law. Moreover, they were found responsible for applying discriminatory prices 
between January 1997 and January 2002, to the detriment of Euroclear Bank SA, a 
German bank.  
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d. State aid 
Finally, the Commission controls whether government intervention or state aid causes 
any distortion in competition and intra-community trade by providing an unfair 
advantage to specific firms. As pointed out by Carletti and Vives (2008), this area is 
particularly relevant for the banking sector because of the availability of a lender of last 
resort. Besides, the events associated with the current financial and banking crisis make it 
a topical issue. A temporary framework has currently been adopted by the Commission to 
give member states “the opportunity to tackle the effects of credit squeeze on the real 
economy”. Indeed, although the literature is increasingly pro-competition, recent events 
have shown that mergers can be allowed for the sake of stability. Recent UK cases are the 
acquisition of the mortgage bank Bradford & Bingley by Abbey National in December 
2008 and the creation of the retail banking giant Lloyds group resulting from the merger 
between Lloyds TSB and HBOS in January 2009.  Both operations were cleared under 
EU Merger Regulation and the EC treaty of state aid rules. These are examples of 
exceptional measures taken to rescue two ailing institutions (Bradford & Bingley and 
HBOS) in the context of the current financial crisis. 
 
 
4. The measurement of competition in the EU banking industry 
In recent years, the EU authorities’ competitive analysis has mainly focused on the 
assessment of horizontal mergers. A set of guidelines (OJ  2004/C 31/03) complement the 
2004 EC Merger Regulation and clarify the Commission’s approach to appraise 
concentration within the scope of the Merger Regulation. The ‘test’ is to assess whether a 
merger “significantly impede effective competition, in particular as a result of the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position in the common market or a substantial 
part of it” (Art. 1). The guidelines also clarify the Commission’s interest in evaluating 
market shares and concentration levels because “they provide useful first indications of 
the market structure and of the competitive importance of both the merging parties and 
their competitors” (Art. 14). Specifically, the Commission first defines the relevant 
geographic and product markets and then applies the market share and HHI rules, as 
illustrated in Table 2. 
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<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Table 2 essentially shows that post-merger entities that are presumed to obtain large or 
very large market shares and HHI are considered a real competitive concern by the 
Commission. These simple measures of market structure are often used by competition 
authorities all over the world, including the US Federal and Trade Commission and the 
Department of Justice. 
The approximate ‘rules’ reported in Table 2 clearly suggest that the authorities assume a 
negative (positive) correlation between market concentration and competition (market 
power). In other words (although a relationship with profits is not tested) they assume the 
validity of the traditional industrial organization theory known as structure conduct-
performance (Bain, 1951). This theory has been challenged in the literature because it 
does not measure competition but it is based on the assumption that concentration 
weakens competition by fostering collusion among firms and ignores the argument that 
firms maybe more profitable because of greater efficiency [5]. 
Dick and Hannan (2008) make two sets of observations: first, that the simple “HHI rule” 
is used as a way to easily identify the cases that need further and more comprehensive 
scrutiny. Second, they claim that one possible reason of the use of unsophisticated 
methods in competition analysis on the part of the authorities is associated with industry-
specific issues. Namely, it relates to the difficulties arising in the definition of inputs and 
outputs for banks. Finally, other possible reasons include for instance, the presence of 
high switching costs in banking; and the difficulties in defining the geographic markets 
and relevant consumers.  
Recent academic works seems to favour the so-called non-structural approaches to bank 
competition developed in the context of the New Empirical Industrial Organisation 
(NEIO) literature. They posit that factors other than market structure and concentration 
may affect competitive behaviour, such as entry/exit barriers and the general 
contestability of the market (Baumol et al. 1982; Bresnahan, 1989; Panzar and Rosse, 
1987). Moreover, differently from structural methods, the competitive environment is not 
implied but is usually measured, as with the price mark-ups approach (the Lerner index 
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of monopoly power and conjectural variations models) and the correlations of input costs 
with output prices (the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic).  
Probably the most important advantage of non-structural approaches is that they do not 
assume a priori that concentrated markets are not competitive because contestability may 
depend on the extent of potential competition (see also Goddard et al., 2001: 81) and not 
necessarily on market structure. Another advantage of non-structural models is that there 
is no need to specify a geographic market, since the behaviour of individual banks gives 
an indication of their market power.  
 
 
5. Competition patterns in European banking 
The following sections present the results of the analysis of competitive conditions in the 
largest five EU banking markets since the year 2000. Focusing on the commercial 
banking sector of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, we test the degree of 
competition by using both structural (concentration ratios, Herfindhal Hirshman Indices) 
and non-structural methods (the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic and the Lerner index. The data 
are derived from BankScope, a global database published by Bureau Van Dijk [6]. We 
restricted the investigation to commercial banks as there are still significant differences in 
the retail market structure among EU member states and in some countries the saving 
banks sector is still partially benefiting from state help [7].  
 
5.1 Process of consolidation in the EU banking sector  
Since the year 2000, the aggregate number of credit institutions in the EU declined 
sharply in most countries. At the end of 2005, there were 8,684 institutions representing a 
decrease of 10.9% relative to 2001. Consolidation has proceeded even faster in the euro 
area with a decrease of 12.5% since 2001 (ECB, 2006). Until recently, concentration 
operations in the EU banking sector have been predominantly of a domestic nature. 
Between 1993 and 2003, the number of M&As involving domestic credit institutions 
represented about 80% of total consolidation activity in the EU (Walkner and Raes, 
2005). However, the pace of domestic consolidation has recently slowed down, whereas 
the value of cross-border bank M&As has been rising, reaching record levels in 2005. 
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EU-wide consolidation has been under way for some time: for example, HSBC and 
Credit Commercial de France (2000); Banco Santander’s acquisition of Abbey (2004); 
Unicredit’s acquisition of HVB (2005); BNP Paribas and Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
(2006); and the acquisition of ABN AMRO by the consortium lead by the Royal Bank of 
Scotland (2007). 
Table 3 shows the means of the structural indicators of market concentration across our 
sample of EU countries for all banks over the period 2000-2005. The Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index (HHI) represents the market share in terms of total assets of every bank 
in the market whereas the CR-5 indicates the market share of the five largest banks.  
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
The degree of concentration of the EU banking system continued to rise; in the period 
2000-2005 the five largest credit institutions increased their share of total assets from 
37.8% to 42.3% (from 39.1% to 43% in the euro area) (ECB, 2006). Against the EU 
average (in 2005, HHI was 601 and CR-5 was 43% for the EU-25), concentration levels 
remain relatively low in Germany, Italy and the UK. With the only exception of Spain, 
the structural measures of concentration have increased significantly in all countries in 
our sample. In the UK alone, in the six years period from 2000 concentration (measured 
as CR-5) increased by 28.57%. 
We also calculated the HHI for the sub-sample of commercial banks on total assets. 
Again, the data show that national conditions still vary considerably across countries (see 
Figure 1) and this is reflected in the different market structures of the retail banking 
industry in general and of the commercial banking industry in particular. Most countries, 
however, experienced an increase in concentration during the period of analysis and this 
might be also reflected in their measures of competition and market power.  
 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
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5.2 Competition patterns in European banking: H-statistic and Lerner index 
Following the established empirical literature, we estimate competition in the five EU 
banking markets using the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic and the Lerner index.  
The Lerner index (Lerner, 1934) is an indicator of the degree of market power and it is a 
well established measure of competition in the banking literature. It represents the extent 
to which market power allows firms to fix a price (p) above marginal cost (mc) [8]. The 
Lerner index is defined as (p – mc)/p; a value of the index equal to zero indicates perfect 
competition, while a value of one indicates monopoly.  
The H-statistics, on the other hand, is an indicator of the degree of market competition 
developed in the context of the NEIO (Panzar and Rosse, 1987). The H-statistic exploits 
the relationship between input prices and equilibrium revenues and it is calculated using a 
reduced form revenue equation that measures the sum of elasticities of total revenues 
with respect to the firm’s input prices. It is based on the premise that monopoly theory 
implies that the revenue of a monopolist falls as marginal cost rises and therefore the H-
statistics is interpreted as follows: H is equal to zero or negative when the competitive 
structure is a monopoly or a perfectly colluding oligopoly. When H is equal to 1, it 
indicates perfect competition; and 0<H<1 indicates monopolistic competition. H can be 
interpreted as a continuous measure of the level of competition, in particular between 0 
and 1, in the sense that higher values of H indicate stronger competition than lower 
values [9].   
Table 4 shows the evolution of marginal costs and of the Lerner index over the sample 
period. Measuring market power is fundamental to the analysis of bank competition: the 
lower the competition faced by a bank (or any other firm), the greater its market power, 
reflected by its ability to set price above marginal costs.  
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
Marginal costs decreased in all countries over the sample period, showing an increase in 
2005. Italy and Spain, which display the highest average marginal costs, also display the 
biggest decrease, possibly because of the reduction of both financial and operating costs. 
Despite the decrease in marginal costs, Italy and Spain report the highest increase in the 
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Lerner index, thereby indicating that the decrease in marginal cost was smaller than the 
decrease in the average price of assets. On average, banks seem to have reduced their mc 
faster than price falls; this will increase the Lerner index thus suggesting greater market 
power and less competition. In all countries (apart from the UK) the Lerner index is 
higher in 2004 than in 2000, thus suggesting less competitive conditions.  
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
 Table 5 reports the estimated H-statistics: results indicate monopolistic competition in all 
countries [10] and ranges from 0.3715 in France to 0.7783 in Germany [11]. Therefore, 
competition in the commercial banking sector seems the highest in Germany, Spain and 
the UK, followed by Italy and France. These results are consistent with the current 
literature, which finds monopolistic competition to be the prevalent market structure in 
European countries [12]. To validate our results, we conducted the equilibrium test for all 
the banking markets and found that the banking systems were in long-run equilibrium in 
the period of study [13]. 
Overall, the empirical analysis has highlighted that the main EU banking markets are 
becoming progressively more concentrated and that there is no evidence of an increase of 
competitive pressure over the period. Further, country differences are also apparent 
thereby indicating that despite the sustained regulatory intervention in the EU banking 
markets, significant barriers to the integration of retail banking markets still exist.  
The empirical analysis seems to provide further evidence that concentration is not 
necessarily a good proxy for competition. Indeed, one of the least concentrated banking 
markets in the EU is Italy; however both the Lerner index and H-statistic estimation 
indicate low competitive conditions.  
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6. Conclusions 
Over the past twenty years, the deregulation and market integration processes have been a 
steady feature of EU banking markets and have given way to profound transformations 
and restructuring, which materialised in enhanced consolidation.  The issue concerning 
increased market concentration, its effect on competition and, indirectly, stability of the 
EU banking sector is of relevance in a period of renewed regulatory efforts to remove the 
remaining barriers and of increased domestic and cross- border M&As. The White Paper 
(2005-2010) declared the aim of the Commission’s competition policy to “use 
competition pro-actively to identify and help tackle barriers in the Single Market”. 
However, our empirical analysis has highlighted significant country differences, thereby 
indicating that despite the sustained regulatory intervention, substantial barriers to the 
integration of retail banking markets still exist. Further, results show that the main EU 
banking markets are becoming progressively more concentrated and that there is no 
evidence of an increase in competitive pressure over the period. The EU Commission, as 
well as national competition authorities typically rely on market share and concentration 
levels to infer competitive conditions (the ‘HHI rule’). However our empirical analysis, 
in line with recent literature, seems to provide further evidence that concentration is not 
necessarily a good proxy for competition. 
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Table 1 
Selected regulatory measures impacting on the EU banking and financial sectors 
 
Year Regulation 
 
1977 First Banking Directive  
1988 Basle Capital Adequacy Regulation  
1988 Deregulation of Capital Movements in the European Monetary System 
(EMS)  
1989 Second Banking Directive  
1993 Investment Services Directive  
1999 Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) 
2000 Directive on e-money  
2001 Directive on the Reorganisation and Winding-Up of Credit Institutions  
2001 Regulation on the European Company Statute  
2004 New EU Takeover Directive 
2005 White Paper on Financial Services Policy 
2007 Capital Requirement Directive (Basle II) 
2007 Markets in Financial Instrument Directive (MiFID) 
 
Source: Adapted from Casu, Girardone and Molyneux (2006). 
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Table 2 
Market share and concentration levels used by the  
European Commission in competitive analysis 
 
 
 
 
Indicators  
 
 
 
Approximate rules 
 
 
Evidence of a 
dominant position in 
the common market 
 
 
Absence of  
competition concerns 
 
Current market share i  of the 
post-merger bank 
 
- Typically very large 
market share ≥50 %  
- Several cases when 
market share between 
40-50% 
- Some cases when 
market share is ≤ 40% 
 
- Market share ≤ 25 %  
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) of the post-merger bank 
calculated as the sum of squared 
market shares of all banks in the 
market: :

n
i
i
1
2  
 
 
- HHI > 2000 and 
ΔHHI < 150 
 
 
 
-  HHI < 1000 
- 1000 < HHI < 2000 and 
ΔHHI < 250 with some 
exceptions (see Art. 20) 
 
Change in HHI is a proxy for the 
change in concentration directly 
brought about by the merger 
HHI
n
i
i 
1
2  
 
 
Source: Adapted from OJ  2004/C 31/03. 
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Table 3 
Concentration Measures: HHI and CR-5 (all banks, by total assets) 
 
  
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2000-2005 
 
Herfindahl-Hirshman Index               
France 587 606 551 597 623 758 29.13% 
Germany 151 158 163 173 178 174 15.23% 
Italy 190 260 270 240 230 230 21.05% 
Spain 581 532 513 506 482 487 -16.18% 
United Kingdom 264 282 307 347 376 399 51.14% 
 
CR-5                
France 47 47 45 47 50 53 12.77% 
Germany 20 20 21 22 22 22 10.00% 
Italy 23 29 31 28 26 27 17.39% 
Spain 46 44 44 43 42 42 -8.70% 
United Kingdom 28 29 30 33 35 36 28.57% 
 
Source: ECB (2006) and Casu et al. (2006). 
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Table 4 
Marginal costs and the Lerner index of monopoly power 
Countries 
 
     
 
Years 
 
France 
 
Germany 
 
Italy 
 
 
Spain 
 
UK 
Marginal 
Cost 
Lerner 
index 
Marginal 
Cost 
Lerner 
index 
Marginal 
Cost 
Lerner 
index 
Marginal 
Cost 
Lerner 
index 
Marginal 
Cost 
Lerner 
index 
2000 0.563 0.139 0.479 0.229 0.629 0.017 0.619 0.009 0.548 0.197 
2001 0.549 0.153 0.479 0.221 0.617 0.034 0.596 0.043 0.543 0.188 
2002 0.563 0.117 0.462 0.232 0.555 0.104 0.586 0.028 0.503 0.210 
2003 0.534 0.156 0.449 0.246 0.548 0.125 0.538 0.059 0.471 0.190 
2004 0.513 0.190 0.447 0.242 0.540 0.144 0.542 0.066 0.502 0.181 
2005 0.577 0.089 0.454 0.230 0.580 0.085 0.589 0.071 0.537 0.148 
 
Note: LERNER=0 indicates perfect competition; LERNER=1 indicates monopoly. 
 22 
Table 5 
H-statistics Results 
 
           
 
 
FRANCE GERMANY ITALY SPAIN UK 
     
H statistic 0.3715*** 0.7783*** 0.5395*** 0.7359*** 0.7433 
      
F test 
(Hstat=0) 
119.14 331.25 389.33 197.35 355.90 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
F test 
(Hstat=1) 
340.96 26.89 283.56 25.43 42.43 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
      
Market in 
equilibrium 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
 
Note: H-stat = 0 indicates monopoly; 1<H<1 indicates monopolistic competition and H-stat = 1 indicates 
perfect competition.  
  
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Figure 1 
HHI of commercial banks by total assets 
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Notes 
 
[1] Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings. Previous merger cases were dealt with either the 
“old” Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, as last amended by Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1310/97; and those dealt with under Article 66 of the former Treaty establishing 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty). 
[2] Under this rule, national authorities cannot carry out a competition review where the 
Commission has jurisdiction, and a decision by the Commission covers the whole EU. 
[3] See Dick and Hannan (2009) for more details and a comparison with the US system. 
[4] Sector Inquiry under Art 17 of Regulation 1/2003 on retail banking - COM(2007)33 
final. 
[5] The industrial organisation literature evolved to account for this possibility. See 
Demsetz (1973); Smirlock (1985); Evanoff and Fortier (1988); Berger (1995). 
[6] Data were collected for an unbalanced sample of 2,701 commercial bank observations 
operating in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom between 2000 and 
2005. An unbalanced panel allows us to account for mergers and acquisitions, entry and 
exit during the period. We use data from consolidated accounts, where available, to avoid 
double-counting. The data were analysed for inconsistencies, reporting errors, missing 
values and outliers. 
[7] For example, until 2005 the German Landesbanks benefited state guarantees that have 
secured the high ratings and have given them access to cheap funding.  
[8] For details on the estimation of the Lerner monopoly power see, among others, 
Shaffer (1993); Berg and Kim (1994); Angelini and Cetorelli (2003); and Fernandez de 
Guevara et al. (2005). 
[9] For more details on the derivation of the Rosse-Panzar H-statistic see, among others, 
Goddard et al. (2001); Bikker and Haaf (2002); Casu and Girardone (2006). 
[10] F-Test results indicate that the both hypothesis H-stat = 0 (monopoly) and the 
hypothesis H-stat = 1 (perfect competition) are rejected in all countries. Therefore the 
hypothesis of 1<H<1 (monopolistic competition) holds in countries.  
[11] Under the assumption of constant elasticity of demand across markets, the model 
specification is consistent with a continuous interpretation of H and thus the comparison 
between countries is acceptable. 
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[12] See, among others, Molyneux et al. (1994); De Bandt and Davies (2000); Bikker and 
Haaf (2002), Claessen and Laeven (2004); Casu and Girardone (2006). 
[13] The equilibrium test can be performed by re-calculating the Panzar and Rosse’s H-
statistics replacing the dependent variable total revenue over assets with the natural log of 
return on assets (which is equal to net income over total assets), as shown in equation (2). 
The findings will be interpreted as follows: H<0 would indicate disequilibrium and H=0 
would indicate equilibrium (see Shaffer, 1982; Molyneux et al., 1994; Claessens and 
Laeven, 2004). 
